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KANT’S HIGHEST GOOD: THE
“BECK-SILBER CONTROVERSY” IN THE
SPANISH-SPEAKING WORLD
Alonso Villarán

In the 1960s Lewis White Beck criticized Kant’s highest good as a moral concept. In 1963 John Silber responded. Thus, the “Beck-Silber controversy.” This
paper explores such controversy in the Spanish literature. It begins identifying
four criticisms: the problems of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and irrelevance. It then identifies a new problem rescued from the Spanish literature:
dualism. After categorizing, following Matthew Caswell, the Spanish defenses
into revisionists, secularizers, and maximalists, this paper assesses these defenses. The paper also translates sections of such literature into English and
leaves us closer to a complete defense of the highest good by salvaging what
it can of the Spanish literature’s unique points.

1. Introduction
As even its name itself reveals, Kant’s idea of the highest good has a very
important place in his philosophy. The idea is found in most of his major
works, including those devoted to answering the three fundamental
questions: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? I am
referring to the Critique of Pure Reason (the first Critique), the Critique of
Practical Reason (the second Critique), and the Religion within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason (the Religion). Moreover, the highest good is ultimately the
answer to the second and third questions, being defined as a world where
virtue is rewarded with happiness.1
Many criticize Kant for proposing the ultimate marriage of virtue and
happiness. In the English-speaking world, the critics of Kant’s doctrine of
the highest good are led by Lewis White Beck who—in his A Commentary on
the Critique of Practical Reason—put into question the moral importance of
the concept. Beck’s negative assessment motivated Silber’s response, “The
Importance of the Highest Good in Kant’s Ethics.” Together, they sparked
the so-called “Beck-Silber controversy”—one that, with subsequent critics

1
For a justification of this definition, see Villarán, “Overcoming the Problem of Impossibility in Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good.”
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and defenders (defenders who, as Caswell2 clarifies, can be classified as
revisionists, secularizers, and maximalists), lasts until our days.
In this paper, I will introduce and critically assess the parallel development of the “Beck-Silber controversy” in the Spanish literature. For this
purpose, I translate into English sections of such literature. Regarding the
critics, the paper reveals a problem not identified by Beck and his followers, which is here called dualism. I do not merely present the problem,
but take the opportunity to tackle it with a tentative response. Regarding
the defenders, I argue that (a) most of their efforts to save the highest good
are flawed and that (b) all of them are incomplete. Some of the defenses
do leave us closer to a flawless and complete defense of the highest good,
but the goal remains unattained. Ultimately, in addition to learning about
the Spanish contributions, the reader will know what a complete defense
of the highest good requires (what problems it needs to address), together
with how it should look (what style of defense is the most appropriate).
This information will serve both the English and Spanish literature on
the topic.
The few Spanish-speaking philosophers that have researched Kant’s
highest good are for the most part aware of the “Beck-Silber controversy.”
Their work is nurtured by this bibliography. Their own contributions,
though, are not yet part of the English literature. Part of my intention in
writing this article is to put both worlds into dialogue. Ideally, this work
will motivate research and answers from its English counterparts.
The paper has the following structure. In §2, I outline the “Beck-Silber
controversy”—its origin and development in the English literature. In
§3, I sketch and assess the parallel development of the “Beck-Silber controversy” in the Spanish literature. In §3.1, I present Thodorocopolous’s3
criticism of the highest good (the aforementioned problem of dualism),
together with my tentative response. In §3.2, I present Panea’s4 revisionist
defense of the highest good, and argue how it—and, by extension, any
revisionists’ defense—ultimately fails. In §3.3, I introduce Aramayo’s5
secularist defense, and argue how it—and, by extension, any secularizing defense—also ultimately fails. Finally, in §3.4, I outline both Gómez
Caffarena’s6 and Vilar’s7 maximalist defenses. Regarding the former, I
argue that, despite taking the correct approach (the maximalist), he fails
by splitting Kant’s ethics in two. I then argue that the latter indeed leaves

2
Caswell, “Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good, the Gesinnung, and the Theory of
Radical Evil.”
3
Thodoracopolous, “Crítica de la Noción del Bien Supremo en Kant.”
4
Panea, “Discernimiento y Ejecución en la Ética de Kant.”
5
Aramayo, “El Bien Supremo y sus Postulados.”
6
Gómez Caffarena, “La Coherencia de la Filosofía Moral Kantiana” and “Respeto y
Utopía.”
7
Vilar, “El Concepto del Bien Supremo en Kant.”
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us closer to a flawless and complete defense of the highest good, but that
much more remains to be done.
2. The Beck-Silber Controversy: Overview and Aftermath
In the second Critique Kant says: “The concept of it [of the highest good]
and the representation of its existence as possible by our practical reason
are at the same time the determining ground of the pure will.”8 Later he
adds that “the moral law . . . commands to promote it.”9 Beck disagrees.
Regarding the first assertion, Beck responds that “to put the highest good
as a determining ground of the will would undermine the principle of
autonomy.”10 Regarding the second assertion, Beck reminds us that none
of the formulas of the categorical imperative—the formula of universal
law,11 the formula of the end in itself,12 and the formula of the kingdom
of ends13—have the highest good as its content. The highest good is also
not found among the ends that are also duties in The Metaphysics of Morals
Metaphysics)—one’s own perfection (virtue) and the happiness of others.14
Finally, the highest good does not exist independently of the moral law:
“For suppose I do all in my power . . . to promote the highest good, what
am I to do? Simply act out of respect of the moral law, which I already
knew.”15 For Beck, to reward virtue is “the task of a moral governor of the
universe, not of a laborer in the vineyard.”16 From this Beck concludes:
“The . . . highest good is not a practical concept at all. . . . It is not important
in Kant’s philosophy for any practical consequence.”17
A close reading reveals that the problems at play are four: heteronomy
(the highest good undermines autonomy), derivation (it cannot be derived
from the moral law), impossibility (it is impossible to promote it), and irrelevance (it is morally irrelevant).
Later critics have reinforced Beck’s attack. Regarding heteronomy,
Auxter18 asserts that the highest good cannot have beneficial effects on
moral motivations. As Kant says in the Groundwork: “An action from duty
has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim
in accordance with which it is decided upon.”19

CPrR 5: 109.
CPrR 5: 114
10
Beck, Commentary, 244.
11
G 4: 421.
12
G 4: 429.
13
G 4: 434.
14
MM 6: 385.
15
Beck, Commentary, 244.
16
Beck, Commentary, 245.
17
Beck, Commentary, 245.
18
Auxter, “The Unimportance of Kant’s Highest Good.”
19
G 4: 399.
8
9

Faith and Philosophy

60

Regarding derivation, Rawls has radicalized Beck’s position.20 In his
view, the moral law and the highest good are not merely unrelated—they
are incompatible:
The highest good is incompatible with the idea of the realm of ends as the
constructed object of the moral law: it cannot be that constructed object, for
there is nothing in the CI-procedure [the categorical imperative procedure]
that can generate precepts requiring us to proportion happiness to virtue.21

Regarding impossibility, Murphy highlights the obscurity of moral
intentions in order to deny that the highest good can be promoted.22 In
fact, how can we reward virtue, if we cannot assess it? As Kant says in
relation to this topic: “In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the
maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on
moral grounds.”23 Friedman—who, despite this criticism, is ultimately a
defender—also claims impossibility, although in his opinion it arises because of the relative nature of happiness.24 As Kant clarifies, happiness “is
such an indeterminate concept that, although every human being wishes
to attain this, he can still never say . . . what he really wishes and wills.”25
What, then, should we give as a reward?
The problem of irrelevance has not changed: the highest good does not
add new duties and cannot be the determining ground of the will—therefore, it is morally irrelevant.
Not all reactions to the highest good are critical, though. In his response
to Beck, Silber gives some thought to the problems under discussion, but
concentrates on that of irrelevance.
The first problem Silber tackles, although insufficiently, is impossibility:
“It is obvious, Beck’s denial notwithstanding, that in rearing children,
serving on juries, and grading papers one tries to do and actually can
do something ‘about apportioning happiness in accordance to desert.’”26
His examples are good, but there is certainly more to be said about this
problem. To begin with, Silber could have foreseen and responded to the
arguments soon to be made by Murphy and later by Friedman. He does
not elaborate his own insight further, and so the strength of Silber’s article
is not found here, as a response to the problem of impossibility.
Silber does a better job regarding derivation and irrelevance, problems
that he deals with simultaneously. In short, Silber sees the highest good
as the compilation of the above-mentioned ends that are also duties in
Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy.
Rawls, Lectures, 316.
22
Murphy, “The Highest Good as Content for Kant’s Ethical Formalism.”
23
G 4: 407.
24
Friedman, “The Importance and Function of Kant’s Highest Good.”
25
G 4: 418.
26
Silber, “Importance,” 183.
20
21
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the Metaphysics: one’s own perfection (virtue) and the happiness of others.
Under this interpretation, the highest good would clearly follow from
the moral law. But why did Kant need to perform such compilation? According to Silber, he did so to complement the categorical imperative—an
imperative that, by itself, would not be suited to provide concrete moral
guidance. Its moral relevance would precisely reside in this function. In
Silber’s words, “the concept of the highest good, while following from the
moral law, adds content to the abstract form of the categorical imperative
and gives direction to moral volition.”27
Silber says nothing regarding heteronomy, but if the highest good follows from the moral law, as he claims, the problem would be implicitly
solved.
In this way, Beck and Silber inaugurated a debate that has lasted through
today. And just like Beck’s criticisms inspired others to follow his lead,
Silber’s defense has had the same effect. As it has been already mentioned,
thanks to Caswell we can organize the defenders in three categories: revisionists, secularizers, and maximalists. With different strategies, and in
different styles, they try to overcome the problems attached to the highest
good.
Briefly, the revisionists think that the highest good solves some supposed problems to be found in the pillars of Kant’s ethics—for example,
the abstract formalism of the moral law, as we just saw with Silber.28 The
secularizers, in turn, try to defend the highest good but through its secularization, i.e., leaving aside the religious postulates that Kant attaches to
it—God and immortality—and the quintessential component of deserved
happiness.29 Finally, the maximalists try to save the highest good in its
entirety and without presupposing that Kant introduced the concept to
rectify earlier problems.30 The maximalists are the most conservative interpreters; the secularizers, the most liberal.
Silber, “Importance,” 193.
Regarding the revisionists we find—besides Silber and Friedman—Mark Packer, “The
Highest Good in Kant’s Psychology of Motivation.”
29
Regarding the secularizers we find, among others, Barnes, “In Defense of Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good,” Guyer, “Beauty, Systematicity, and the Highest Good,” Kleingeld,
“What Do the Virtuous Hope For?,” Moran, “Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good” and “The
Ethical Community as Ground of Moral Action,” Nenon, “The Highest Good and the Happiness of Others,” Nuyen, “Kant on God, Immortality, and the Highest Good,” O’Neill, “Kant on
Reason and Religion,” Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Smith, “Worthiness to be Happy and Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good,” van der Linden, Kantian Ethics
and Socialism, and Zeldin, “The Summum Bonum, The Moral Law, and the Existence of God.”
30
Regarding the maximalists we find—besides Caswell—Anderson-Gold, Unnecessary Evil, Bowman, “A Derivation of Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good” [translated into
Spanish by Martínez as “Una Deducción del Concepto de Sumo Bien Kantiano”], Denis,
“Autonomy and the Highest Good,” Engstrom, “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s
Moral Theory,” Godlove, “Moral Actions, Moral Lives,” Insole, “The Irreducible Importance
of Religious Hope in Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good,” Mariña, “Making Sense of
Kant’s Highest Good,” O’Connell, “Happiness Proportioned to Virtue,” Ostaric, “Works of
Genius as Sensible Exhibitions of the Idea of the Highest Good,” Wike, Kant on Happiness in
Ethics, Wike and Showler, “Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good and the Archetype-Ectype
27
28
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Recapitulating, we have at least four problems and three styles of defense. The problems are those of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and
irrelevance. These can be faced as revisionists, secularizers, or maximalists.
The “Beck-Silber controversy” started in the English-speaking literature, but has impacted academia elsewhere. Within Spanish-language
scholarly literature, for example, we find some scarce yet valuable interpretations—primarily attempts of defense. In what follows, I will outline
and evaluate these contributions—starting with a critic.
3. The Beck-Silber Controversy in the Spanish-Speaking World
3.1. Thodoracopolous and the Problem of Dualism
The group of the highest good’s critics, we just saw, is composed of Beck
and those who regret Kant’s inclusion of the highest good in his ethical
system due to the problems of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and
irrelevance. The article that seems to be the first in Spanish regarding Kant’s
highest good is also a critique. It is a small article published by Thodoracopolous—by then President of the Academy of Science in Athens—in the
early 1970s. Interestingly, the criticism announced in the title is none of
those identified by Beck, but one that we may call the problem of dualism.
The critique comes at the end of the text and touches on Kant’s apparent inconsistency in speaking of human happiness as sensible and the
promise—granted by the highest good—of receiving it as a reward for
virtue in an afterlife:31
How would it be possible that happiness, an empirical notion, could accompany the soul after the death of the body? Even if it were assumed that there
is certain symmetrical relation between morality and happiness—something even questionable during human life—, why would it be necessary
that the symmetry between these two of such different magnitudes will be
prolonged after the death of the body, of a body that—according to Kant—is
a preliminary condition of the empirical world and origin both of happiness
and of human disgrace?32

In other words, if the highest good will ultimately be realized in an afterlife (as the postulate of immortality33 indicates), but human happiness is
grounded in corporeity, then the reward for virtue, happiness, will have no
value.34 Because of this, Kant’s idea of the highest good would make no sense.
Distinction,” and Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion. My works on Kant’s highest good are also
maximalist defenses: “Overcoming the Problems of Heteronomy and Derivation in Kant’s Idea
of the Highest Good,” “El Sumo Bien Kantiano,” “Overcoming the Problem of Impossibility,”
and “Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good: Its Ethical Importance for the Overcoming of Evil and
to Answer the ‘Whither’ Question.”
31
All translations that follow are made by the author of this paper.
32
Thodoracopolous, “Crítica de la Noción,” 7.
33
CPR A811/B839 and CPrR 5: 122.
34
Kant defines happiness as sensible in several places. For instance, in the Groundwork he
says happiness is the entire satisfaction of our needs and inclinations (4:405). In the second
Critique, he in turn defines it as “the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of
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This criticism, though, may be built upon a false premise: that in the afterlife, for Kant, we will be purely spiritual beings. Did Kant really believe
that? The obvious place to look for an answer would be the religion he
professed, Christianity. Paraphrasing Sandel, who claims that “although
he was a Christian, Kant did not base morality on divine authority,”35 we
can say that “although Kant did not base morality [highest good included]
on divine authority, he was a Christian.” Now being Christian implies certain beliefs—quintessentially the resurrection of the body.
Aramayo—the Spanish-speaking secularizer—takes this thread to indirectly answer Thodoracopolous: “Most probably Kant has in mente a
process of resurrection . . . (with all security that of Christian resurrection . . . ) because without it, his definition of happiness as satisfaction of
needs becomes hardly tenable.”36 So assuming that Kant, a Pietist, had the
resurrection of the body in mind, as it is safe to assume, the problem of
dualism vanishes: the promise of happiness contained in the highest good
will be ultimately actualized in a future life, but still in embodied beings.
Of course, the Christian link does not solve the problem philosophically. Does the resurrection of the body fit with Kant’s philosophy? To
answer this, we have to look to the English-speaking literature, outside
the “Beck-Silber controversy.” Specifically, I refer to Bunch, who answers
with a straightforward yes—and with good reasons.37
Bunch starts identifying two places where Kant speaks negatively of
the resurrection of the body: the Religion38 and The Conflict of the Faculties
(the Conflict).39 Let’s consider Kant’s words in the Religion:
The hypothesis of the spirituality of the rational beings of this world, according to which the body can remain dead on earth and yet the same person
still be living . . . this hypothesis is more congenial to reason, not merely because it is impossible to conceive a matter endowed with thought, but, most
of all, because of the contingency to which our existence after death would
whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his
will” (5:124). In the Metaphysics, to mention one more definition, happiness is the “satisfaction with one’s state . . . with what nature bestows” (6:387). Kant, though, recognizes other
states of well-being, such as contentment and beatitude. Contentment is “analogous of happiness that must necessarily accompany consciousness of virtue . . . a negative satisfaction
with one’s existence . . . which cannot be called happiness [emphasis added] because it does not
depend upon the positive concurrence of a feeling” (CPrR 5:117–119). Beatitude, in turn,
resembles contentment but is greater insofar as it implies “complete [and not merely contingent] independence from inclinations and needs” (CPrR 5:119). Regarding these distinctions,
it is important to highlight that, when Kant defines the highest good, he speaks of happiness
in proportion to virtue—and not of contentment or beatitude. For a thorough discussion
of Kant’s definition of happiness, contentment, and beatitude, see Wike, Kant on Happiness,
1–25.
35
Sandel, Justice, 107.
36
Aramayo, “El Bien Supremo,” 102.
37
Bunch, “The Resurrection of the Body as a Practical Postulate.”
38
R 6: 128n.
39
CF 7: 40.

Faith and Philosophy

64

be exposed if we made it rest merely on the coherence of a certain clump of
matter under a certain form, whereas we can conceive the permanence of a
simple substance as natural to it.—On the latter presupposition (of spirituality) reason can, however, neither find in dragging along, through eternity,
a body which, however purified, must yet consist . . . of the same material
which constitutes the body’s organic basis and which, in live, the body itself never quite grew fond of; nor can it render comprehensible what this
calcareous earth, of which the body consists, should be doing in heaven,
i.e. in another region of the world where other matters might presumably
constitute the condition of the existence and preservation of living beings.40

Despite this and a similar remark in the Conflict, Bunch claims that
a sensibly conditioned afterlife, is “not only ‘more congenial to reason’
than a purely spiritual one, but a subjectively necessary belief, a ‘practical
postulate.’”41 He offers three reasons for this.
First, “only a sensibly conditioned future life makes sense of the happiness that should be part of a transcendent highest good.”42 Here Bunch
is doing the opposite of Thodoracopolous. While the latter claims that the
highest good does not make sense because the future life for Kant was
purely spiritual—an idea that he does not develop but merely asserts—
Bunch claims that Kant must have believed in the resurrection of the body
because, otherwise, the doctrine of the highest good would make no sense.
Second, “only a sensible conditioned afterlife makes sense of the moral
striving that should take place there.”43 As Kant states in the second Critique:
Complete conformity of the will with the moral law is . . . holiness, a perfection
of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment
of his existence. Since it is nevertheless required as practically necessary, it
can only be found in an endless progress toward that complete conformity. . . .
This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of
the existence and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly
(which is called the immortality of the soul).44

That such moral progress will continue in a future world indicates that
we will still be embodied beings, since the corresponding striving is in
great measure caused by our corporeity: the law of happiness opposing
the moral law. As Kant says in the Groundwork, “if I were only [a member
of the intelligible world], all my actions would always be in conformity
with the autonomy of the will.”45
Third, “Kant’s notion of the ‘absolute unity’ of the human person requires that we conceive the afterlife as embodied.”46 A place where Kant
R 6:129n.
Bunch, “Resurrection,” 50.
42
Bunch, “Resurrection,” 50.
43
Bunch, “Resurrection,” 54.
44
CPrR 5: 122.
45
G 4: 454.
46
Bunch, “Resurrection,” 55.
40
41
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states this absolute unity is the Metaphysics, when philosophizing about
marriage right: “But acquiring a member of a human being is at the same
time acquiring the whole person, since a person is an absolute unity.”47
Note that Kant is saying “absolute” and not “relative” unity.
In sum, with these three reasons Bunch claims that to deny the resurrection of the body is more “expensive,” philosophically speaking, than
affirming it: it demands many more revisions of Kant’s other views. These
reasons could have eventually moved Kant to retract his marginal remarks
in the Religion and the Conflict.
Bunch also develops a fourth and final point to “assuage the worry
that ‘saddling’ Kant with such a view is absurd or uncharitable.”48 The
claim is that “the resurrection of the body was a live option among
Kant’s philosophical and literary contemporaries.”49 Now in addition to
assuaging worries, this point parallels and reinforces the reason given
before regarding Kant’s Christianity: not only he was a Christian, which
again implies belief in such resurrection, but such belief was taken seriously by his peers.
Even if the preceding answer to the problem of dualism does not
convince the reader,50 this review of the Spanish literature is already profitable: the problems that endanger the highest good are not reducible to
those pointed out by Beck and his followers. One may suppose that this
discussion is already in place in the English literature, but it is not. There
is a debate around the resurrection of the body in Kant’s philosophy of
religion—as the referred work of Bunch shows—but the issue has not
been raised as a criticism of Kant’s idea of the highest good, as it has in
the Spanish literature. In other words, the problem of dualism is not yet
part of the English version of the “Beck-Silber controversy.” This is what
opens up new discussions around the highest good. One could reject,
for instance, Aramayo’s indirect response to Thodoracopolous, insisting
with more elaborated arguments that Kant was a dualist, and that this
wounds the reasonableness of the highest good. One could also side with
Aramayo, and so on and so forth.
3.2. Panea, the Revisionist
As summarized, the revisionists are led by Silber and argue that the
highest good is morally important since it corrects some supposed problems to be found at the pillars of Kant’s ethics (as these are established in
the Groundwork and the Analytic of the second Critique). In the Spanishspeaking world Panea follows this trend. His response to the problem of

MM 6: 278.
Bunch, “Resurrection,” 50.
49
Bunch, “Resurrection,” 57.
50
The thesis that Kant embraced the resurrection of the body is controversial. One who
denies it is Keith Yandell, “A Response to the Papers: Who is the True Kant?”
47
48
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irrelevance is that, if the highest good were impossible, “the wellspring of
morality would dry completely.”51
To understand Panea’s thesis we need to remember how the highest
good works as the bridge between ethics and religion. In the first Critique,
and more specifically the second section of the Canon of Pure Reason,
Kant explains this bridge as follows.52 The moral law commands the promotion of the highest good, i.e., a world where people are virtuous and
proportionally happy. Now since the moral law commands it, the highest
good must be possible. But the complete harmonization of happiness
and virtue can be possible only if God exists and if the soul is immortal.
Therefore, it is rational to postulate their existence. In this way the highest
good—originally a moral concept—opens the door to religion and to the
hope for a future happy life.
Panea’s argument is that if that door were closed, i.e., if the promise
of personal happiness were denied, something, namely moral motivation,
would be eventually irreversibly lost. The following two quotes summarize his position:
In the domain of the individual, Kantian morality, the morality of duty, is
also one of hope, because if he who does what he ought to, cannot hope for
anything, the wellspring of morality will end up drying out. Said in another
way, morality in Kant will risk dissolving considering two motives: on one
side, if eudaimony sits as its principle, i.e. the principle of happiness, morality
will end up finding a sweet death (euthanasia); on the other hand, if all hope
for happiness is barred from us [emphasis added], morality will end up dying
of sadness, of starvation: i.e. we will attend to a progressive weakening of
the moral interest, to a discouragement that will become chronic, and to a
demoralization that will end up emptying of meaning the question “why
keep being moral?”

Panea adds that this affects morality at the level of execution, not of discernment:
Not at the grounding level, but at the level of the realizability of the ethical
project, the hope in the possibility of the highest good affects the moral effort
itself, that will remain vain and illusory, although, of course, well grounded,
well intended. . . . But then, although success is not determinative regarding how I ought to act, it becomes vital at the hour of performing that which
I ought, because if nothing results or no result is to be expected out of the
moral effort, the effort itself will lose, for Kant, meaningfulness and consistency, whereupon, the wellspring of morality will end up drying. For all this
. . . duty in itself is unsustainable without the hope for happiness, or, at least,
without the future possibility of it.53

The problem with Panea, and with the revisionists in general, is one we
may call illusion: they see problems where Kant saw none. As Caswell puts
Panea, “Discernimiento y Ejecución,” 398.
CPR A804/B832–A819/B847.
53
Panea, “Discernimiento y Ejecución,” 412.
51
52
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it, the revisionists “must either ignore or judge as inadequate the solutions
to the problems . . . offered in the Analytic of the second Critique.”54 Specifically regarding the problem of motivation, Panea must deny that the feeling
of respect for the moral law is the only proper and sufficient incentive of
the will. As Kant states in the second Critique, “respect for the moral law is
therefore the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive, and this feeling
is also directed to no object except on this basis.”55 The moral relevance
of the highest good, hence, must lie somewhere else, not in self-interested
moral motivation—which, in addition to being inaccurate, as just shown, reinforces one of the other problems at stake, i.e., the problem of heteronomy.
Imagine that Kant only wrote the Groundwork, where the highest good
as a world where virtue is rewarded with happiness is absent. Does this
absence undermine the work in any substantial way? I do not think so and
I do not think Kant thinks that either. The moral law would still be there,
unconditionally commanding to treat humanity always as an end, at odds
with the principle of happiness, and reminding us that the latter is not the
most important thing in the world. Or envision an atheist Kantian, one
unconvinced by the religious features of Kant’s philosophy. Could she not
still, throughout her life, honor the categorical imperative? I do not see
why not. Now if this is the case, then the idea of the highest good, which
among other things makes it reasonable to expect a future reward for our
goodness, is not necessary for moral motivation.
We could very well, hence, restrict ourselves to the wisdom of the
Groundwork and live a sober moral life. This, of course, does not deny other
potential reasons for the moral—and not merely religious—relevance
of the highest good. But the promise of happiness that accompanies the
highest good is not one of them.
What to do, then, with Kant’s assertion in the first Critique?
Thus without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped
for, the majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation
of admiration but not incentives for resolve and realization, because they
would not fulfill the whole end that is natural for every rational being and
determined a priori and necessarily through the very same pure reason.56

Here I take Kant as saying that the ultimate failure of the highest good
would hurt selfless moral motivation. This is so because such failure is a
failure of the moral law. Why? Because, as Kant states in several places,
the moral law commands the highest good.57 So if the highest good were
impossible, the moral law would be commanding a chimera, and those
committed to this moral project would know, beforehand, that their efforts
are condemned to failure. Would not their selfless moral motivation be hurt?
Caswell, “Kant’s Conception,” 186.
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This is precisely Kant’s point in the Critique of the Power of Judgment,
where he presents the case of an ethical atheist, “Spinoza,” who “does
not demand any advantage for himself from his conformity to this [the
moral] law, whether in this or another world,” but yet witnesses again
and again that the moral world that that same moral law orders—the
highest good—is not getting closer, but rather farther away.58 Facing this,
“Spinoza” cannot help but regard the highest good as impossible: “The
end, therefore, which this well-intentioned person had and should have
before his eyes in his conformity with the moral law, he would certainly
have to give up as impossible.”59 Either that, or “Spinoza” would have to:
assume the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e. of God, from a practical point of view, i.e., in order to form a concept of at least the possibility
of the final end that is prescribed to him by morality—which he well can do,
since it is at least not self-contradictory.60

As we can see, this “Spinoza” is not worried about his happiness, but
about the possibility of contributing to what the moral law ultimately
orders. In other words, it is his selfless, and not his selfish moral motivation
that matters.
This insight, by the way, does not imply a later revision, done by Kant
himself, of the basic pillars of his own ethical system. The highest good is
not artificially added from outside this system to rectify some supposed
problems (like that of motivation), as the revisionists believe. Rather, it
evolves out of the moral law to tell us something else about morality—for
instance, where the moral law is leading us and what kind of world it
envisions, as Kant outlines in the Religion.61 In other words, the highest
good is presented to add to, not rectify, Kant’s moral system, enriching the
moral landscape. As such, the problem of illusion remains.
That said, Panea is not only prey to the problem of illusion: he is also
prey to another which is typical among the defenders, a problem that we
may call incompleteness. The problem of incompleteness consists in leaving
unsolved—usually, but not only, due to a lack of recognition—some or all
the other problems at stake. In the case of the revisionists like Panea, they
focus on the problem of irrelevance but pass over those of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and dualism. So because of illusion and incompleteness,
Panea’s defense of Kant’s highest good fails.
3.3. Aramayo, the Secularizer
The secularizers, let’s remember, try to save the highest good through its
secularization. As Caswell explains:
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A leading trend in the interpretation of the highest good, especially in the
English-speaking literature, attempts to extract a “secularized” version of the
highest good from Kant’s account. The secularizers hope to save the highest
good by divesting it of its difficult religious features, including Kant’s idea
that in the highest good, happiness will exist in proportion to virtue.62

In the Spanish-speaking literature, Aramayo follows this trend. In
his view, Kant’s works on the philosophy of history—like the Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (the Idea)—offer an alternative,
secular version of the highest good. This version, in Aramayo’s opinion, is
“much more respectful with the basic axiom of the formal ethic, than those
sustained in his [Kant’s] moral theology.”63
In the renewed highest good, Aramayo argues, the focus is no longer
the person, but the human species, and the element of proportionality,
together with the postulates of God and of immortality, are left aside: “In
this framework the species [not each person, but a future generation of
humans] will attain its destiny [the highest good] by means of antagonism
[foreseen as the hidden plan of nature].”64 Even the highest good is here
redefined, Aramayo claims, as the “complete unfolding of our natural dispositions . . . oriented to a better use of reason.”65 This, in some way, will
lead not only to a more ethical world, but also to a happier one.
That antagonism brings flourishing is explained by Kant with this example:
Just as trees in a forest, precisely because each of them seeks to take air and
sun from the other, are constrained to look for them above themselves, and
thereby achieve a beautiful straight growth; whereas those in freedom and
separated from one another, that put forth their branches as they like, grow
stunted, crooked and awry. All culture and art that adorn humanity, and the
most beautiful social order, are the fruits of unsociability.66

The great advantage that this secular version has, Aramayo clarifies,
is that it overcomes the problem of heteronomy. Why? Because the hope
for happiness that the highest good contains is not one’s own, but that
of future generations. As Aramayo explains, “to work for the sake of the
descendants omits the search for one’s own happiness . . . the personal
interest stays completely within parenthesis in the decisions aimed to that
goal of generational progress.”67
Aramayo does not mentions the other problems at stake—derivation,
impossibility, and irrelevance—presumably because he does not recognize
them. One may think that he has developed the means to deal with them,
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but he misses the opportunity to show it. Instead, Aramayo speaks of
another problem that this version of the highest good generates, one characteristic of secular interpretations: a problem we may call injustice.
The problem of injustice refers to the individual fate of living human
beings and those who have died, who will never enjoy the distributive
justice that the highest good promises and that they may have earned.
Aramayo says: “At first sight, nonetheless, [this version of the highest
good] contains a serious inconvenience of equal caliber, namely: the happiness proportionally adequate to virtue would not be happen in the same
moral agent that deserves it, but a bliss is tilled that the descendants will
collect.”68 Despite this, in Aramayo’s opinion the problem of injustice is not
so bad: “Since each generation will wield a higher degree of morality than
the former, it is just that it be happier than its ancestors.”69
Aramayo’s answer to the problem of injustice, though, is unsatisfactory
for the following reason. It may be the case that Kant’s contemporaries
were morally better and happier than their ancestors, that we are better
versions of eighteenth-century humanity, and that two and a half centuries
from now our descendants improve even more. This, though, does not do
justice to the millions of people who, despite being good, lived miserable
lives due to sickness, poverty, natural disasters, crime, war, etc. At the individual level, therefore, injustice still prevails. To say, as Aramayo does,
that their deserved happiness will be harvested by future human beings
only makes things worse: it implies regarding them merely as means, and
so the injustice duplicates.
Now even accepting the unsatisfactory answer given by Aramayo to
the problem of injustice, he is still subject to the other criticism that affects
secularizers as a group, a problem we may call disloyalty: they betray Kant
for Kant. Caswell puts it in the following way:
When we deny the theological nature of the highest good, we deny almost
all the significance he [Kant] clearly believed the highest good had, as the
link between morality and rational religion. Of course, we are greater friends
of the truth, but the rejection of so much of Kant’s thought should be undertaken as a last resort.70

From the first Critique to the Religion, the highest good links morality
and religion. In the first Critique, the highest good (also called the moral
world) is the answer to the questions of “What should I do?” and “What
may I hope”? It is a duty to promote the highest good and one can rationally hope to enjoy it one day. As Kant says, “Thus God and a future life
are two presuppositions that are not to be separated from the obligation [to
promote the highest good] that pure reason imposes on us in accordance
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with principles of that very same reason.”71 Twelve years later, in the Religion, Kant insists that, through the highest good (also called the ethical
community), “morality thus inevitably leads to religion.”72 This leads
us to agree with Caswell: the highest good’s secularization should be a
last resort.73
In the case of Aramayo, nevertheless, it is even doubtful that, in the
Idea, Kant is speaking of the highest good. Kant does speak of a universal
cosmopolitan condition that may resemble the highest good, but the latter
is not mentioned, at least not under that name. These are Kant’s words in
the Idea: “This gives hope that after many transforming revolutions, in the
end that which nature has as its aim will finally come about—a universal
cosmopolitan condition, as the womb in which all original predispositions of
the human species will be developed.”74 And even if it were the case that
Kant has the highest good in mind, though, this work is previous to the
second Critique, where we find the most extensive account of the highest
good, one in which the postulates of God and immortality,75 together with
the proportionality of happiness and virtue that the highest good entails,76
are reaffirmed. It is easy to imagine Kant protesting Aramayo’s secularization of the highest good.
Aramayo’s defense, in sum, fails not only because of its incompleteness,
but also because of problems that are typical of secular interpretations of
the highest good: the problems of injustice and disloyalty.
3.4. Gómez Caffarena and Vilar, the Maximalists
The maximalists try to save the highest good in the most conservative
fashion: without claiming it is there to fix previous problems or stripping
it of its religious components. In the Spanish literature, Gómez Caffarena
has developed an original maximalist response to the problem of derivation. The highest good, he argues, must not be understood as an exogenous
or even contradictory element in Kant’s ethics. Instead, the highest good
is a complementary and even more original—chronologically speaking—
element of it.
To begin with, the moral law and the highest good would be more
closely related than Kant’s interpreters—such as Beck and Rawls—tend to
CPR A811/B839.
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think. Consider the supposed strict rigidity of the formal nature of the categorical imperative, as this is defended in Kant’s most formalist-inspired
work: the Groundwork. Even in that book, Gómez Caffarena argues, the
rigidity is loosened through the incorporation, in the second and third
formulations of the moral law, of humans as ends in themselves and of the
kingdom of ends. With their incorporation, the formalism of the moral law
is ultimately overwhelmed and the distance between it and the highest
good shortened. In the case of the kingdom of ends—we may add—the approaching of these two ideas almost reaches a degree of identity: because,
what at last distinguishes the kingdom of ends from the highest good?
Gómez Caffarena explains the loosening of the formal nature of the
moral law:
In multiple steps of his argumentation Kant shows that he is not satisfied
with the first formula of the categorical imperative . . . the strictly formal . . .
Kant declares that this [categorical imperative] . . . needs justification:
We have not yet advanced so far as to prove a priori that there really
is such an imperative . . . is it a necessary law for all rational beings always to appraise their actions in accordance with such maxims as they
themselves could will to serve as universal laws?77
As known, Kant looks for an answer to this question in the condition of “end
in itself” that all human personal subjects have. . . . However: to roll back
in such a way the formal criterion (1st formula) to its justification in that we
must “act in such a way that humanity is used in each person always at the
same time as an end, never merely as a means” (2nd formula), elevating us
in such way as co-legislators, all for all, through the consciousness of each
one (3rd formula, that of “autonomy” or of the “kingdom of ends”), equates
to admitting that the formalism is not strict formalism; that there is always already in it something of what appears more fully in the orientation towards
the “highest good.”78

That said, Kant never renounced his formalism. As Kant himself says,
“one does better if in moral judgment he follows the rigorous method and
takes at his basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative.”79
This moves Gómez Caffarena to look for a definitive solution to the
problems related to the highest good by interpreting Kant’s ethics as “originating from a double inspiration” or two wellsprings (fuentes): “respect”
and “utopia.”80 This, though, should not lead us to speak of two ethics in
Kant—as authors like Heller suggest.81 It should not because—following
the allegory—“the waters of the double source mingle.”82 The duality,
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though, would demand assigning a loose coherence between the ethics of
the Groundwork and the Analytic of the second Critique on one hand, and
the ethics of the first Critique, of the Dialectic of the second Critique, and of
the Religion on the other. This looseness would be reflected in the double
interpretation that one can make of the kingdom of ends:
a) The kingdom of ends as a community of those who, out of respect to
[ante] the absolute worth of the personal being, commit themselves
(as co-legislators) to never take themselves as pure means: keystone
of a morality of respect.
b) The kingdom of ends as a community of those who, out of an overflowing solidarity, commit themselves to look for their integral
good, the highest possible good of the universe: the beginning of a
utopian morality.83
From this perspective, the highest good is closely related to the moral
law and ultimately is mixed with it, but still separated in its origins. Gómez
Caffarena is aware that his view of a loose coherence implies renouncing
the perfect unity of Kant’s philosophical system: “My hypothesis suggests
precisely the renunciation of this perfect unity of the system—without
renouncing thus necessarily the system and a certain unity of it.”84
Gómez Caffarena reinforces his interpretation with a diachronic reading
of Kant’s works, according to which the second wellspring, i.e., utopia
(and, with it, the highest good), is not only older—even pre-critical—but
also the “compost [humus]” out of which the “germs of formalism” developed (his choice of words85). Of course, one can protest that Kant changed
his mind in the post-critical times, but the reappearance of the highest
good in the Dialectic of the second Critique, the Religion and so on proves
that he kept the doctrine.
Is Gómez Caffarena’s solution to the problem of derivation satisfactory?
I do not think so. In fact, if the highest good springs from a different “wellspring” than that of the moral law—from “utopia” instead of “respect”—it
makes more sense to consider it an artificial addition and to deny its place
in Kant’s ethics. After all, for Kant all duties are ultimately rooted in the
moral law. Proof of the latter is that Kant speaks of the categorical imperative as the “supreme principle of morality”86 and as the “fundamental law
of pure practical reason.”87 Proof can also be found in that every time Kant
derives a duty, he does so from the moral law, as when he derives the
duties of not committing suicide, of keeping promises, of cultivating one’s
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talents and of benefiting others in the Groundwork.88 The real challenge,
hence, is to derive the highest good from the moral law.
In other words, Gómez Caffarena’s defense fails in not seeing that there
is only one ethical wellspring in Kant, the moral law, whose waters would
not converge with those of the highest good, but that instead—keeping
the metaphor—would flow into it, like a river that flows into the ocean.
Gómez Caffarena, in other words, is prey to a problem we may call splitting: instead of deriving the highest good from the moral law, he splits
Kant’s ethics in two. To this extent—and to the extent that he does not
answer the problems of dualism, heteronomy, impossibility, and irrelevance
(i.e., because of incompleteness)—Gómez Caffarena’s defense fails.
Gómez Caffarena, it has been mentioned, is not the only Spanishspeaking maximalist—another is Vilar, whose defense we now review. In
his article, Vilar argues that there are two ethics in Kant: one formal—that
of the Groundwork and the Analytic of the second Critique—and one material—that of the Dialectic of the second Critique, the Religion, etc. The second
would be built upon the first, so they do not contradict, but rather complement each other. Vilar even speaks of a material categorical imperative,
which orders to promote the highest good:
Together with the imperative of universalizing our norms of conduct (the
formal imperative) [the second ethics] provides us a priori a material imperative that says: “act so that you promote the highest good in the world,”
understanding the highest good—unlike the merely higher good, which is
virtue—as the meeting of virtue and happiness.89

Vilar’s article develops in the following order. First, he recognizes that
his interpretation of Kant’s highest good mirrors that of Yovel.90 Second,
he asserts that the mature Kant could not erase the “whither” question91
as a moral one—one that leads to the highest good. Third, he presents
a list of reactions to Kant’s idea of the highest good since the days of
Schleiermacher—and explains the general lack of interest in the topic until
the “Beck-Silber controversy” in the English-speaking world. Fourth, he
signals six features—the first four borrowed from Habermas92—that would
characterize Kant’s “first” ethics: it is deontological, cognitivist (“it understands the righteousness of norms or commandments by analogy with
the truth of assertoric or theoretical statements”93), formalist, universalist,
dualist, and monological. Fifth, he shows how, for Kant, the first ethics
would prevail over the second.94 Sixth, he compiles several formulations of
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the so-called material imperative in Kant’s works—starting with the first
Critique: “Do that through which you will become worthy to be happy.”95
Seventh, he distinguishes five different versions of the highest good in
Kant’s work: a personal, a universal, two immanent, and a transcendent
highest good. Eighth, he presents three moral functions that the highest good fulfills (something I will develop immediately). Ninth, he signals the practical
implications of the highest good for Kant’s moral philosophy. Tenth and
finally, he looks for reasons that could explain Kant’s effort to complement
his original, formal ethics, with a material one.
What do all these tell us regarding the problems that orient our present
enquiry—i.e., the problems of dualism, heteronomy, derivation, impossibility,
and irrelevance? Not as much as we would like. To begin with, he says
nothing regarding dualism and impossibility—despite being well aware of
the Spanish and English literature. Regarding derivation and heteronomy, in
turn, it is clear that Vilar believes that the highest good follows from the
moral law and so does not undermine autonomy. Nowhere, though, does
he develop such a derivation or argue how the highest good does not bring
about heteronomy. It is only regarding irrelevance that Vilar offers something more substantial: the highest good has three ethical functions—the
synthetizing, totalizing, and destination functions:
The Synthetizing Function: The first of them [of the functions] is that of synthesis, i.e., of solving at the practical level this serious problem of the whole
critical philosophy: the problem of the radical separation between the a
priori and the empirical, and most specially this surprising and more than
problematic divorce between the phenomenic and the noumenic man. The
concept of the highest good comes to provide a horizon of synthesis, a horizon of reconciliation between freedom and nature, which is at the same time
a task for the will. At the level of intention, the good will, the pure moral
good (Gute), can reconcile itself with the merely sensible or natural good
(Wohl); at the level of action, the good will, which rests upon its mere inner
freedom, finds a way to externalize itself.96
The Totalizing Function: In the second place, the concept of the highest good
performs also a function of totalization, i.e., of integration in a whole, not
only the heterogeneous elements that have to be synthetized, but of separated items of the same type that have to be integrated in a totalizing sequence.
This is precisely what happens with moral actions, which, without the ultimate reference to the highest good, appear as atomic, isolated acts, without
a structure of continuity, of coherent and concatenated process.97
The Destination Function: In the third and final place, the concept of the
highest good performs the important role of providing a final objective end to
the will (that Kindgom of God in Earth). With it Kant solves the problem of
the indeterminacy of human will in the absence of any reference to an end.98
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This is all that Vilar says regarding the moral relevance of the highest
good. It would help if he unfolded in more detail each of these reasons, or
at least if he grounded them in Kant’s texts, but he does neither. He could
have, for instance, recognized traces of those functions in the preface to
the first edition of the Religion.
In fact, in the Religion we find Kant recognizing that morality has no
need for an end “to recognize what duty is or to impel its performance.”99
The highest good, though, is morally relevant for another reason, namely
for answering the “whither” question:
Instructed . . . as to how to operate but not as to the whither, [reason] can
itself obtain no satisfaction . . . for it cannot possibly be a matter of indifference to reason how to answer the question, What is then the result of this
right conduct of ours? . . . It cannot be a matter of indifference to morality . . .
whether it does or does not fashion for itself the concept of an ultimate end
of all things (although . . . harmonizing with this end does not increase the
number of morality’s virtues but rather provides them with a special point
of reference for the unification of all ends).100

“Ultimate end of all things,” “unification of all ends”—what are these if
not traces of the synthetizing, totalizing, and destination functions that Vilar
mentions in favor of the highest good? These are, then, rooted in Kant’s
works. Not only that but, in my opinion, they prove the moral relevance
of the highest good (without denying that a fleshier argumentation is required). So despite dealing—although too briefly—with the problem of
irrelevance, Vilar’s defense is prey to the problem of incompleteness: he takes
us closer to a complete defense of Kant’s highest good, but leaves unanswered the problems of dualism, heteronomy, derivation, and impossibility.
4. Conclusion
The Beck-Silber controversy as developed in the English-speaking world
has had a parallel development in the Spanish literature. Summarizing
the findings, we first identified a new criticism: that of dualism. It was formulated by Thodoracopoulos, in whose opinion it does not make sense to
speak of happiness in corporeal terms and then of virtue as a reward for it
in a future immaterial life. The problem of dualism has also been addressed
indirectly by Aramayo, who suggests Kant’s belief in the Christian resurrection of the body—a thesis that, if true (as I have tried to show with the
help of Bunch), solves the problem under consideration.
There is also a revisionist, Panea, who focuses on the problem of irrelevance and claims that the highest good solves a problem of motivation. His
defense, though, is prey to the problem of illusion—for Kant, the feeling of
respect for the moral law is the sole incentive of the will.
Aramayo is a secularizer. In his opinion, there is a secular highest good
in Kant’s works on the philosophy of history. He tackles the problem of
99
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heteronomy, but his defense is in turn the source of new problems: those of
injustice and disloyalty.
Gómez Caffarena’s maximalist defense, in turn, focuses on the problem
of derivation, but ends up failing by not rooting the highest good in the
moral law, falling prey to the problem of splitting. Vilar, the other maximalist, focuses on the problem of irrelevance and offers several good
reasons for the moral importance of the highest good. He does it, though,
in an extremely schematic way, leaving the reader craving for more—
starting with references to Kant’s work.
All of the defenders, in addition, are prey to the problem of incompleteness. None of them address all the problems at stake—and not due to an
academic division of labor, but more seemingly to the general blindness
of not recognizing that the problems linked to the highest good are no less
than five.
A complete and flawless defense of Kant’s highest good, hence, is still
missing in the Spanish-speaking world, but not only there. After all, this
discussion mirrors the Beck-Silber controversy as developed in the English-speaking world. Such a defense requires an answer to all the problems
at stake—not merely heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, irrelevance, but
also dualism. It also should not be the source of new problems, like those
of illusion, injustice, disloyalty, or splitting.
Some of the latter set of problems, it is important to add, are inherent to
the corresponding styles of defense. The problem of illusion is inherent to
the revisionist approach, whereas the problems of injustice and disloyalty
are inherent to the secularizer one. This is why the real (and hardest) way
to defend Kant’s highest good is the maximalist approach. One can fail in
the effort, as Gómez Caffarena does by splitting Kant’s ethics in two, but
this does not have to be the case.
Not all arguments in favor of the highest good fail, though. Aramayo’s
indirect response to the problem of dualism and Vilar’s case against that
of irrelevance leave us closer to a complete and flawless defense. But this is
only two-fifths of the road, we know now.
Is such a defense possible? I think it is, but its corresponding development exceeds the aim and scope of this paper, which has enriched the
discussion in a different way—not only by translating and introducing
new interpretations, but also by showing what a proper defense requires
and how it should look, as well as by salvaging what is valuable in support of the highest good from the defenses considered above.101
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